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The theory of our jury system is that the conclusions  
to be reached in a case will be induced only by  
evidence and argument in open court,  
and not by outside influence,  




Digital communication and online research are ubiquitous,  
immediately responsive, and much easier and more effective  
than analog research and communication— all characteristics that  
present unprecedented temptation to jurors… to many people,  




Some might dismiss these incongruous perspectives as a result of changing 
times, but that ignores the real issue. The Internet is a development the American 
jury system never contemplated and does not know how to respond to. While as-
pects of our jury process evolved over time,
4
 the role of the individual juror was 
static; he or she decided questions of fact based on evidence and testimony admit-
ted at trial.
5
 That time is done. The Internet has changed, and will increasingly 
change, how jurors execute their duties, and it will significantly reshape the Ameri-
can jury system itself. This article begins that comprehensive discussion. 
This article has four sections. Section I examines the roles of the American 
criminal and civil jury systems, including how each is predicated on, and subject to, 
the actions of individual jurors. Section II discusses Internet use and explains how 
the Internet is increasingly inseparable from the lives of current and prospective 
jurors. In Section III, we turn to the Internet’s impact on the jury system before, 
during, and after juror service. Finally, Section IV brings us to potential judicial 
responses to the Internet’s role in the American jury system: prohibit juror Internet 
                                                          
 1. See Definition of Static, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/static 
(last visited Apr. 8, 2015). 
 2. Patterson v. Colo. ex rel. Att’y Gen. of Colo., 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907). 
 3. See Ralph Artigliere, Sequestration for the Twenty-First Century: Disconnecting Jurors 
From the Internet During Trial, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 621, 626–27 (2011). 
 4. See Jury: Legal Aspects – Selecting Jurors, LAW LIBRARY – AM. LAW AND LEGAL INFO., 
http://law.jrank.org/pages/1434/Jury-Legal-Aspects-Selecting-jurors.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2015) (dis-
cussing juror eligibility evolution in the United States). 
 5. See, e.g., Nicole L. Waters & Paula Hannaford-Agor, Jurors 24/7: The Impact of New Media 
on Jurors, Public Perceptions of the Jury System, and the American Criminal Justice System, NAT’L 
CENTER FOR ST. CTS, http://www.ncsc-jurystudies.org/What-We-
Do/~/media/Microsites/Files/CJS/What%20We%20Do/Jurors_%2024-7_REV011512.ashx (last visited 
Apr. 8, 2015) (“The traditional strength of the jury system rests on the assumption that the jury considers 
only evidence properly admitted at trial.”); see also John Schwartz, As Jurors Turn to Web, Mistrials are 
Popping Up, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/18/us/18juries.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (“Jurors are not supposed to 
seek information outside of the courtroom. They are required to reach a verdict based on only the facts the 
judge has decided are admissible . . . .”). 
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use, limit Internet use biasing jurors, or embrace juror Internet use within our cur-
rent system. 
II. JURIES IN THE UNITED STATES
6
 
A. Criminal Juries 
There may be no feature more distinctive of American legal culture than 
the criminal trial jury. Americans have a deep and stubborn devotion  
to the belief that the guilt or innocence of a person accused of crime  




The American criminal jury system is a frequent topic of legal scholarship, 
not only because it is a defense to potential attacks in the criminal trial process,
8
 but 
also because of its significant, some would opine even singular, importance in our 
criminal justice system itself.
9
 The United States Constitution implements the crim-
inal jury safeguard through a combination of provisions. First, Article 3, Section 3 
guarantees that: 
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; 
and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have 
been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall 
be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.
10
 
Second, the Sixth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that “[i]n all crimi-
nal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by 
an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been commit-
ted.”
11
 Finally, the right to trial by jury is provided, in state proceedings, by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
12
 While the Constitution provides 
parameters for the criminal jury system, it does not mandate uniformity,
13
 thus 
                                                          
 6. The need for independent juries is one of the primary reasons the American colonies de-
clared independence. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (1776) (“For depriving us in 
many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury . . . .”). 
 7. CLAYTON S. CONRAD, JURY NULLIFICATION: THE EVOLUTION OF A DOCTRINE 1, 1 (1998), 
available at http://famguardian.org/Subjects/Activism/JuryNullification/JuryNullEvolOfADoctrine.pdf.  
 8. See, e.g., Nancy Jean King, The American Criminal Jury, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41, 
43(1999) (“Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable 
safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric 
judge.”). 
 9. See, e.g., N. Pieter M. O’Leary, Across the 49th Parallel: A Historical and Comparative 
Overview and Analysis of Some Similarities and Differences Between the United States and Canada Rela-
tive to Juries in Criminal Trials, 27 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 539, 548 (2010) (“[j]uries are viewed as the 
ultimate protection for criminal defendants.”). 
 10. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 3. 
 11. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 12. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160 (1968). 
 13. King, supra note 8, at 44:  
Individual state courts and legislatures have considerable room to experiment with different 
jury procedures consistent with the minimum protections of the Sixth Amendment, and have 
sometimes expanded upon its guarantees, providing more protection than the United States 
Constitution requires. The thousands of juries convened each day (over ninety percent of 
them in state courts) are governed by hundreds of state constitutional provisions, statutes, and 
court rules of varying complexity and content. Congress, too, has supplied a multitude of 
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states have great latitude in process, including the number of deciding jurors and 
whether a convicting vote must be unanimous.
14
 
While the importance of the criminal jury is lauded, criminal jurors are not 
perfect and may engage in behaviors compromising the integrity of that system, 
such as violating court orders. Such action is “juror misconduct,”
15
 and it can cause, 
at least, three very different outcomes. First, if juror misconduct occurs within a 
proceeding resulting in conviction, a defendant may appeal that conviction and 
receive a new trial.
16
 Second, if a juror engages in the same misconduct, but the 
jury acquits, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects the de-
fendant from being retried for that crime.
17
 Third, jurors may disregard the law to 
acquit a defendant accused of a crime, though the proof at trial demonstrates guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.
18
 These disparate results demonstrate that criminal ju-
ror misconduct can cause systemic problems. As we will see, the likelihood of juror 
misconduct is increased, potentially beyond calculation, by the Internet. 
B. Civil Juries 
While societally vital,
19
 there is little actually written about adoption and im-
plementation of the American civil jury system.
20
 It seems likely the system gar-
                                                                                                                                      
statutes and rules governing jury trials in the federal courts, also supplementing the constitu-
tional commands of the Bill of Rights. The federal constitutional declarations of the U.S. Su-
preme Court, in other words, are only the common core of a much larger body of jury law in 
the United States which varies significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
See also Kimberly A. Mottley et al., The Jury’s Role in Administering Justice in the United States: An 
Overview of the American Criminal Jury, 21 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 99, 101–02 (2002). 
 14. See King, supra note 8, at 46. 
 15. Juror Misconduct is defined as, “violation of a court’s charge or law by a person who serves 
on the jury.” Juror Misconduct Law & Legal Definition, USLEGAL.COM, 
http://definitions.uslegal.com/j/juror-misconduct/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2015). 
 16. See King, supra note 8, at 50. 
 17. Id.  
 18. This is “jury nullification.” See Jury Nullification, CORNELL U. L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/jury_nullification (last visited Apr. 8, 2015): 
Jury Nullification 
A jury’s knowing and deliberate rejection of the evidence or refusal to apply the law either 
because the jury wants to send a message about some social issue that is larger than the case 
itself, or because the result dictated by law is contrary to the jury’s sense of justice, morality, 
or fairness.  
Jury nullification is a discretionary act, and is not a legally sanctioned function of the jury. It 
is considered to be inconsistent with the jury’s duty to return a verdict based solely on the law 
and the facts of the case. The jury does not have a right to nullification, and counsel is not 
permitted to present the concept of jury nullification to the jury. However, jury verdicts of ac-
quittal are unassailable even where the verdict is inconsistent with the weight of the evidence 
and instruction of the law.  
 19. Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 285, 285 
(1999) (“Americans have relied on juries of ordinary citizens to resolve their civil disputes since the begin-
ning of the colonial period.”). 
 20. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Some Notes on the Civil Jury System in Historical Perspective, 
48 DEPAUL L. REV. 201, 201 (1998) (“It is an interesting fact that there is no full scale history of the Amer-
ican [civil] jury. What there is—and the literature is not large—deals mostly with criminal cases. . . . Thus, 
the criminal jury gets the lion’s share of the attention and the civil jury sits home among the ashes.”). When 
the American civil jury system is the subject of scholarly discourse, it is usually in the context of its rela-
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nered significant support because it appeared to provide protection from bureau-
cratic tyranny.
21
 In this capacity, as so eloquently explained by Alexis de Tocque-
ville, it may be even more important than American criminal jury system.
22
 The 
civil jury was universally adopted by the first American state constitutions
23
 and by 
the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution.
24
 While civil jury com-
position,
25
 and final decision-making “numbers”
26
 have changed over time, its pur-
pose remains the same—to decide civil disputes using evidence and testimony ad-
mitted at trial.
27
 However, our civil jury system, like its criminal system sibling, is 
predicated on its jurors and vulnerable to their misconduct. Juror activities, in both 
systems, cause increasing concerns.
28
 
Since 1999, at least ninety verdicts have been challenged based on Internet-
related juror misconduct.
29
 This is a small number, but the pace is alarming. More 
than half of those occurred between 2008 and 2010,
30
 and, of those, judges granted 
new trials or overturned verdicts in twenty-one trials between 2009 and 2010 
                                                                                                                                      
tionship to the English jury system. See generally Justin C. Barnes, Lessons from England’s “Great Guard-
ian of Liberty”: A Comparative Study of English and American Civil Juries, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 345, 362 
(2005) (“The jury system was still being developed in England when it was imported to the United States as 
part of the “cargo” brought over by the first colonists.”). 
 21. See Landsman, supra note 19, at 288; see also Barnes, supra note 20, at 362–63 (“[I]n the 
United States . . . juries became a bulwark against royal overreach and genuinely protected individuals’ 
rights.”). 
 22. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 284–85 (Phillips Bradley ed., 
1946): 
I am so entirely convinced that the jury is pre-eminently a political institution that I still con-
sider it in this light when it is applied in civil causes. Laws are always unstable unless they 
are founded upon the manners of a nation; manners are the only durable and resisting power 
in a people. When the jury is reserved for criminal offences, the people only witnesses its oc-
casional action in certain particular cases; the ordinary course of life goes on without its inter-
ference, and it is considered as an instrument, but not as the only instrument, of obtaining jus-
tice. This is true a fortiori when the jury is only applied to certain criminal causes. 
When, on the contrary, the influence of the jury is extended to civil causes, its application is 
constantly palpable; it affects all the interests of the community; everyone co-operates in its 
work: it thus penetrates into all the usages of life, it fashions the human mind to its peculiar 
forms, and is gradually associated with the idea of justice itself. 
 23. See Landsman, supra note 19, at 288. 
 24. U.S. CONST. amend. XII: 
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right 
of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined 
in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law. 
 25. See Waters & Hannaford-Agor, supra note 5. 
 26. See, e.g., Colgrove v. Battlin, 413 U.S. 149, 160 (1973) (holding that the Seventh Amend-
ment does not require a twelve person jury); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 89 (1970)(referring to limita-
tion to a twelve person jury as a “historical accident”). 
 27. For a much more comprehensive discussion, see George L. Priest, The Role of the Civil Jury 
in a System of Private Litigation, 
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1616&context=fss_papers (last visited Apr. 
8, 2015). 
 28. A 2010 Westlaw search for “juror misconduct” provided some recent historical data. It re-
vealed 2,701 results for the years 1980-1990, 3,990 results for 1990-2000, and 8,755 results for 2000-2010. 
See Daniel William Bell, Juror Misconduct and the Internet, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 81, 93 (2010). 
 29. See Brian Grow, As Jurors Go Online, U.S. Trials Go Off Track, REUTERS (Dec. 8, 2010, 
3:23 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/08/us-internet-jurors-idUSTRE6B74Z820101208. 
 30. Id. 




 In three-quarters of the cases where judges declined to declare mistrials, 
they nevertheless found Internet-related misconduct on the part of jurors.
32
 This 
should come as no surprise in light of online use trends.
33
 In fact, it should provide 
a clear warning of what to expect in the future. As one young, prospective juror so 
succinctly put it, ironically on her online blog, “EVERYBODY UNDER THIRTY 
IS ON THE INTERNET” (emphasis not added).
34
 
III. THE BIRTH AND GROWTH OF THE INTERNET 
The Internet is technically, even boringly, “an electronic communications 
network that connects computer networks and organizational computer facilities 
around the world.”
35
 In reality, it is far more compelling, perhaps even fascinating. 
It is, to borrow a slogan, “Every one of us. Everywhere. Connected.”
36
 While em-
pirically inaccurate, this latter definition is insightful because, while over-stating 
the Internet’s current availability, it may be prescient. 
Many of us accept the Internet as a fixture in our lives without much thought. 
We do not realize how recent Internet use, much less widespread Internet use, real-
ly is. In 1999, only 40% of Americans age 16-years and older accessed the Inter-
net.
37
 Twenty years later, 74% did.
38
 Moreover, 85% of Americans over age 18 
have Internet access
39
 and the United States currently has more than 267,000,000 
Internet users.
40
 Global Internet use increased 1000% from 1999 to 2013.
41
 As of 
April 2014, there were approximately 2,955,625,560 Internet users worldwide and 




                                                          
 31. Id. 
 32. The article also noted, “These figures do not include the many incidents that escape judicial 
notice.” Id. 
 33. See infra text accompanying notes 37–43 
 34. See Eric P. Robinson, Virtual Voir Dire: The Law and Ethics of Investigating Jurors Online, 
36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 597, 597 (2013). 
 35. See Internet, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/internet (last visited Apr. 8, 2015). 
 36. See INTERNET.ORG, http://www.internet.org/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2015). 
 37. See INTERNET LIVE STATS, http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/ (last visited 
April 8, 2015). 
 38. See Sydney Jones& Susannah Fox, Generations Online in 2009, PEW RES. INTERNET 
PROJECT (Jan. 29, 2009),http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1093/generations-online. This dramatic usage increase 
is not limited to America. Recent data for the U.K. shows that 35% of U.K. adults used the Internet daily in 
2006. As of 2013 that number was 73%; see Lyndon Harris, Has the Internet Destroyed Trial by Jury?, 
CRIM. L. & JUST. WKLY (Aug. 17, 2013), http://www.criminallawandjustice.co.uk/features/Has-Internet-
Destroyed-Trial-Jury. 
 39. See Michael Springer, 57 Cities Now Have Free Wi-Fi, but They’re Not Thinking Big 
Enough, ARTS. MIC (Oct. 9, 2013), http://www.policymic.com/articles/66891/57-cities-now-have-free-wi-
fi-but-they-re-not-thinking-big-enough. 
 40. See INTERNET LIVE STATS, supra note 37. 
 41. Id. 
 42. In late 2004 Facebook had 1,000,000 users, by 2009 that had grown to 250,000,000, and, as 
of 2013, there were more than 1.1 billion Facebook users per month. See ASSOCIATED PRESS, Number of 
Active Users at Facebook over the Years, YAHOO! NEWS (May 1, 2013, 7:27 PM), 
http://news.yahoo.com/number-active-users-facebook-over-230449748.html. The world’s population is 
currently estimated at 7.7 billion people. See Current World Population, WORLDOMETERS, 
http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2014). That means, in less than ten 
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While the Internet exponentially increases the availability of information, the 
development with the greatest direct impact on current and prospective jurors is the 
proliferation of devices granting almost immediate access to that information. As of 
2013, over half of all Americans owned a smartphone,
43
 tablets seemed ubiqui-
tous,
44





 A study of prospective jurors found that 89% had Internet access 
through a desktop or laptop computer, 86% had such through their phones, and 
75% used the Internet via PDA (some form of “personal data assistant device”).
47
 
These developments not only increase the availability of Internet information, they 
foster reliance on almost instant access to such materials.
48
 The end result is that 
jurors are increasingly tied to the Internet and, as a result, the Internet is a signifi-
cant consideration for the jury system. 
IV. JURORS AND THE INTERNET 
The courtroom sits squarely atop the Internet highway.
49
 
While it is unsaid, jurors are expected to live their juror lives within four 
walls. They are summoned to the courthouse. If chosen to serve as jurors, they sit 
in a courtroom. When the time comes to deliberate, they adjourn to the jury room. 
They eventually return to the courtroom to deliver their verdict. Enter the Internet, 
a world without walls. It will change how jurors are chosen to serve, the infor-
mation they seek, use, and disseminate during service, and how they conduct them-
selves post-service. 
                                                                                                                                      
years, a non-necessity (Facebook) has gone from statistical insignificance, to use by 1 in every 7 people on 
the planet, every month. Id. 
 43. Dara Kerr, Smartphone Ownership Reaches Critical Mass in the U.S., CNET MAGAZINE 
(June 5, 2013, 5:35 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/smartphone-ownership-reaches-critical-mass-in-the-u-
s/. 
 44. See Angela Moscaritolo, Survey: 35 Percent of Americans Own a Tablet, PC MAG (Oct. 18, 
2013, 4:24 PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2425979,00.asp. This is a truly sobering statistic. If 
we accept the Apple iPad as the first commercially available “tablet,” by June of 2013 thirty-five percent of 
Americans owned a device they could only buy since April of 2010.See iPad, WIKIPEDIA: THE FREE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IPad (last visited Apr. 9, 2015). 
 45. See INTERNET LIVE STATS, supra note 37.  
 46. There is no central tally, but Google searches for “courthouses with internet access” and “ju-
dicial buildings with Internet access” show many so equipped facilities, at the federal, state, and municipal 
levels. 
 47. PAULA HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., JUROR AND JURY USE OF NEW MEDIA: A BASELINE 
EXPLORATION 5, available at 
http://www.sji.gov/PDF/NCSC_Harvard_005_Juror_and_Jury_Use_of_New_Media_Final.pdf. The re-
searchers also noted, “These statistics are comparable to those of Internet access and usage in other studies 
of contemporary American culture.” Id. 
 48. See Rebecca Myhr Szajna, Surrendering Your Smartphone at the Courthouse Door: Ad-
dressing the Rise of Technology-Related Juror Misconduct, TIMELY TECH @ THE U. OF ILL. (Dec. 2, 2013), 
http://illinoisjltp.com/timelytech/surrendering-your-smartphone-at-the-courthouse-door-addressing-the-rise-
of-technology-related-juror-misconduct/. 
 49. See Julie Blackman & Ellen Brickman, Let’s Talk: Addressing the Challenges of Internet-
Era Jurors, THE JURY EXPERT: THE ART & SCIENCE OF LITIGATION ADVOCACY (Mar. 30, 2011), 
http://www.thejuryexpert.com/2011/03/lets-talk-addressing-the-challenges-of-internet-era-jurors/. 
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A. Attorneys Will Use the Internet to Select and Sway Jurors 
American jurors are vetted through the voir dire process.
50
 Voir dire is the 
“preliminary examination of prospective jurors to determine their qualifications and 
suitability to serve on a jury, in order to ensure the selection of fair and impartial 
jury.”
51
 The procedural purpose of voir dire is to secure an impartial jury, meaning 
a jury free from bias.
52
 However, trial attorneys know that the real purpose of voir 
dire is to try to empanel jurors sympathetic to their respective positions, and elimi-
nate those who are not.
53
 To those ends, attorneys want as much information as 
possible regarding prospective jurors.
54
 
Voir dire varies as trial courts have wide discretion regarding form and con-
tent.
55
 Commonly, judges address topics such as prior jury service and prospective 
juror opinions about the legal system, and may explore issues such as religious be-
liefs and practices when pertinent.
56
 However, there are limits. These may range 
from concerns for juror privacy
57
 to the fact that judges may not know what topics 
to explore.
58
 Traditional voir dire can only go so far. Information may exist shed-
ding further light on possible juror biases, but additional research is necessary to 







 support such investigation. 
                                                          
 50. See THE FREE DICTIONARY, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/voir+dire (last vis-
ited Apr. 9, 2015). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Douglas M. Bates, Jr., Voir Dire Examination in Criminal Jury Trials: What is the Proper 
Scope of Inquiry?, 70 FLA. B.J. 64, 64 (1996). 
 53. See, e.g., Carol J. Williams, Jury Duty? May Want to Edit Online Profile, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 
28, 2008), http://articles.latimes.com/2008/sep/29/nation/na-jury29. 
 54. See Juries and Social Media, LTT (August 15, 2013), 
http://www.lawtechnologytoday.org/2013/08/juries-and-social-media-free-book-excerpt-from-social-
media-as-evidence/: 
In addition to researching individual jurors, parties should also consider social media research 
to discover trends of thought, attitudes, opinions, and the like among the jury pool in the area, 
particularly in a high profile case. Indeed, information obtained from social media sites may 
be different from that found in traditional media outlets and, most importantly, closer to 
the actual opinion of the potential jurors than the views expressed in traditional media. In-
depth social media research includes not only user-generated content on traditional social 
media sites (including blogs), but also user comments on other sites such as traditional media 
sites. 
 55. Bates, supra note 52, at 65. 
 56. Id. at 65–66. 
 57. See, e.g., Thaddeus Hoffmeister, Applying Rules of Discovery to Information Uncovered 
About Jurors, 59 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 28, 31 (2011) (“As concerns about juror privacy started to 
capture the attention of judges, academics, and the public as a whole, it became increasingly difficult to 
investigate jurors in certain jurisdictions.”). 
 58. This is particularly true in the Internet age. While a Judge may now inquire as to potential 
Facebook use, it would never have occurred to a Judge to ask such a question even 10 years ago. See Han-
naford-Agor, supra note 47, at 2. 
 59. Hoffmeister, supra note 57, at 30 (“As more and more personal information is placed online, 
attorneys are increasingly turning to the internet to investigate and research jurors. In certain jurisdictions, 
the practice has become fairly commonplace.”). 
 60. One prominent trial consultant contends that, “Anyone who doesn’t make use of [internet 
searches] is bordering on malpractice.” See id. In reality, no court has yet found the failure to conduct online 
research on prospective jurors as attorney malpractice, but one author believes at least one high court is 
 
2015] SPRING EDITION 397 
 
While judges may be leery of, or time constrained from, querying jurors about 
certain information, the Internet has no such reservations. Many potential jurors 
have an online presence.
62
 Attorneys can access public records of prospective ju-
rors, including marital, arrest, and property ownership information, and individuals 
often provide information regarding organization membership, including religious 
and political party affiliations, via social media sites like Facebook.
63
 One can read-
ily understand why attorneys in dissolution of marriage, criminal, tort, and civil 
rights cases might want to know such things when reviewing potential jurors. One 
can also understand why courts increasingly support practitioners seeking such 
information
64
 as it, at least theoretically, decreases the risk of biased jurors becom-
ing or remaining part of the jury panel. The upside is that Internet research may 
reveal information traditional voir dire does not.
65
 The downside is that this in-
creased security will not come without potential cost. Such online research could 
logically be feared as invasion of privacy, and privacy is important to prospective 
jurors.
66
Knowledge that jury service might—or would—involve online checks, 
could drive an already low rate of reply to jury summons even lower.
67
 
Attorneys will use the Internet to attempt to identify jurors receptive to their 
messages. Some will go further and use the Internet to influence sitting and pro-
spective jurors. A recent trend in litigation is for parties to use online sources for 
                                                                                                                                      
hinting at such an obligation. See Robinson, supra note 34, at 636 (referencing the Missouri Supreme 
Court). 
 61. See Hoffmeister, supra note 57, at 30 n. 5 (citing Johnson v. McCullough, 306 S.W.3d 551, 
558–59 (Mo. 2010) (en banc)); Carino v. Muenzen, No. L-0028-07, 2010 WL 3448071, at *7–8 (N.J. Su-
per. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 30, 2010). 
 62. Williams, supra note 53 (stating that about 10% of jurors had an online presence, but that 
number was increasing “exponentially”). The article was published in 2008. The observation was correct. 
By 2014, 87% of potential jurors had emails accounts and 64% had social media accounts. Hannaford-
Agor, supra note 47, at 5. 
 63. For an explanation of Facebook, see Facebook, WHATIS.COM, 
http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/Facebook (last visited April 24, 2014) [hereinafter Facebook Defini-
tion]. 
 64. See Thaddeus Hoffmeister, Google, Gadgets, and Guilt: Juror Misconduct in the Digital 
Age, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 409, 417 (2012) [hereinafter Google, Gadgets, and Guilt] (“Recently, online 
investigation of jurors has gained increased acceptance among practitioners. Moreover, courts and state bar 
associations have both approved of and encouraged the practice.”). For discussion of rules and guidelines 
regarding online research of sitting and prospective jurors, see Erika L. Oliver, Researching Jurors on the 
Internet: The Ills of Putting Jurors on Trial and the Need to Shift the Focus Back to the Defendant, 34 U. 
LA VERNE L. REV. 251, 273–78 (2013). 
 65. See Hoffmeister, supra note 57, at 32: 
In certain instances, attorneys investigating jurors learn things that would rarely, if ever, come 
up or be discussed during voir dire. This is because the attorney or judge never thought to 
pose the question, the topic was too personal in nature, or the information arose after jury se-
lection. For example, judges generally prohibit attorneys from questioning a potential juror 
during voir dire about her political ideology or who she voted for in the last presidential elec-
tion. By going online, however, the attorney may discover which political candidates the juror 
donated to in the most recent election and whether the juror belongs to any particular political 
organizations. Thus, in a way, online research provides an alternative route or “end run” by 
which attorneys learn additional information about jurors. 
 66. “Most people dread jury duty – partly because of privacy concerns.” See United States v. 
Blagojevich, 614 F.3d 287, 293 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 67. See Hoffmeister, supra note 57, at 36. Conversely, such inquiry could also reduce the risk of 
a “rogue juror” (one who seeks to serve as a juror for self-serving reasons) and reduce attorney reliance on 
hunches or stereotypes when exercise juror strikes. Id. at 35. 
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advocacy. While the development is recent enough to lack empirical analysis, one 
author identifies six instances where parties developed websites, or website con-
tent, to support their trial positions.
68
 These included high profile defendants Mi-
chael Jackson and Martha Stewart.
69
 Content included text and video clips designed 
to influence viewers and readers.
70
 There are no limitations on such content, includ-
ing trial admissibility, and it is available to anyone. Parties can display largely 
whatever they desire online, hoping prospective and sitting jurors find it.
71
And, as 
discussed next, many of them will. 
B. Jurors Will Conduct Pre-Trial Internet Research and Form Pre-Trial Opinions 
While the risk of pre-trial publicity always exists, the Internet makes it easier 
for prospective and selected jurors to seek out pre-trial information,
72
 or accidental-
ly encounter such materials,
73
 and form pre-trial opinions.
74
 That is significant be-
                                                          
 68. See Jeffrey T. Frederick, Did I Say That? Another Reason to do Online Checks on Potential 
(and Trial) Jurors, JURY RES. SERVICES (Oct. 13, 2011, 4:10 PM), http://www.nlrg.com/blogs/jury-
research/bid/69503/Did-I-Say-That-Another-Reason-to-Do-Online-Checks-on-Potential-and-Trial-Jurors. 
 69. See id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. This strategy will not be limited to hope; it will be highly strategic. Facial recognition soft-
ware already exists. It maps points on a person’s face and then compares those points with other faces, 
seeking a single match or a very small pool. See, e.g., Kevin Bonsor & Ryan Johnson, How Facial Recogni-
tion Systems Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS, http://electronics.howstuffworks.com/gadgets/high-tech-
gadgets/facial-recognition4.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2015). While young, the technology is already very 
accurate. See Will Oremus, Facebook’s New Face-Recognition Software is Scary Good, FUTURE TENSE 
(Mar. 18, 2014, 5:45 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2014/03/18/deepface_facebook_face_recognition_software_is_97
_percent_accurate.html (discussing a 97% accuracy rate). One can only imagine how effective this could be 
when paired with development such as Google Glass. See Paul Saffo, Google Glass Signals a Wearables 
Revolution, CNN (Apr. 16, 2014, 11:39 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/16/opinion/saffo-google-
glass/index.html?hpt=hp_c2. In the not-too-far-distant future attorneys will be able to look at jurors, find 
and identify them online, and direct them to targeted content or deliver such content to them.  
 72. See, e.g., Russo v. Takata Corp., 774 N.W.2d 441, 444 (S.D. 2009) (juror researching de-
fendant while part of jury pool); John G. Browning, Legally Speaking: When all that Twitters is not Told—
the Dangers of the Online Juror (Part One), SE. TEX. REC. (May 13, 2009, 9:45 PM), 
http://setexasrecord.com/arguments/218993-legally-speaking-when-all-that-twitters-is-not-told-the-dangers-
of-the-online-juror-part-1 (discussing uncited cases where jurors conducted online research on lawyers, 
judges, defendants, and victims). 
 73. Waters & Hannaford-Agor, supra note 5: 
[C]ontemporary jurors are also accustomed to receiving constant updates in the form of email 
and text messages, tweets, and notices from social networking sites that do not require active 
intent to acquire new information. They just arrive, unsolicited, on one’s computer screen or 
smart phone with information formatted in the highly abbreviated style of headlines, sound 
bites, and bullet points.  
 74. Frederick, supra note 68: 
A potential juror was recently held in contempt in an Oklahoma murder trial where Jerome 
Ersland, a pharmacist, had shot a robber five times after the robber lay wounded and motion-
less on the floor. While the potential juror had said that she had not expressed an opinion on 
the case, the defense discovered that she had made comments critical of the pharmacist on the 
local television’s Facebook site six months before the trial.  
“First hell yeah he need to do sometime!!! The young fella was already died from the gun 
shot wound to the head, then he came back with a different gun and shot him 5 more times. 
Come let’s be 4real it didn’t make no sense!” 
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cause exposure to pre-trial publicity causes, or potentially contributes to, at least 
two serious problems. First, pre-trial publicity can bias individual jurors, perhaps 
even outweighing what they learn at trial. According to one author’s synopsis of 
available research, “pretrial publicity exerts a disproportionate imprint on juror 
memory compared to the evidence actually presented at trial,”
75
 and “studies col-
lectively confirm that the impact of pretrial publicity on individual juror judgments 
about defendant culpability carries through to the collective verdicts rendered by 
juries.”
76
 The second problem is that pre-trial publicity may significantly impact 
not just individual jurors, but the entire jury. This may occur when one or more 
jurors with pre-trial based perspectives taint the whole group,
77
 or because all or 
part of the jury knowingly allows pre-trial information to be considered.
78
 
The Internet is a primary source of information for prospective jurors and it 
will shape their pre-trial opinions, and resulting actions, in ways past information 
sources could not. This is a significant challenge to a jury system based on inde-
pendent jurors rendering their decisions based only on evidence and testimony elic-
ited in the courtroom.
79
 This threat will not end when trial begins, as jurors will use 
the Internet during trial as well. 
C. Jurors Will Conduct Internet Research During Trial and Deliberations 
One would find it very difficult to not use the Internet, 
 or perform a task or service that does not rely on the  
Internet each day.  Against that background and with a huge amount of 
information just a Google search away, 
                                                          
 75. Waters & Hannaford-Agor, supra note 5, at 7. 
 76. Id. 
 77. There is no study that quantifies this, but the risk mirrors the traditional concern about note 
takers on a jury. “Probably the gravest concern is that the best note takers (or the only note taker) may dom-
inate jury deliberations.” Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative 
Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441, 570 (1997) (citing United States v. Maclean, 578 
F.2d 64, 66 (3d Cir. 1978)). The analogous concern is that the juror with the “best” information may also 
dominate. Courts strongly fear this risk. In 2009, a San Francisco judge dismissed 600 potential jurors after 
several acknowledged performing online research on the pending case. See ABA JUDICIAL DIVISION, A 
FAIR TRIAL: JURORS USE OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES AND THE INTERNET1 (2010),available at 
http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Jury/fairtrialhandbookauthcheckdam.ashx [hereinafter A FAIR 
TRIAL]. 
 78. According to one study of 30 mock juries designed to test the effect of pre-trial publicity: 
Not only did pre-trial publicity [“PTP”] have powerful effect—that effect was consistent 
across all thirty juries. Every single one of the juries exposed to PTP discussed what they had 
read/heard about the trial. Rarely did a juror in any of the thirty groups halt the PTP discus-
sion despite pre-deliberation admonitions to not discuss PTP and to halt any discussion that 
should arise during deliberations. Rather, they acknowledged the information came from PTP 
and then agreed to discuss it anyway! 
Douglas Keene, Pretrial Publicity & Jury Deliberations, KEENE TRIAL CONSULTING (June 17, 2011), 
http://keenetrial.com/blog/2011/06/17/pretrial-publicity-jury-deliberations/ (citing CL Ruva & MA 
LeVasseur, Behind Closed Doors: The Effect of Pretrial Publicity on Jury Deliberations, 18 PSYCHOL., 
CRIME & L., 431, 431–52 (2011). 
 For a real example, see A FAIR TRIAL, supra note 77, at 3, discussing a 2007 South 
Dakota trial where a prospective juror performed Internet research on the defendant when learning 
the caption of the case. He became part of the jury and shared the search, and its results, with at least 
five other jurors. There were no objections by fellow jurors. 
 79. See Artigliere, supra note 3, at 639. 
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 is it realistic to expect jurors not to use the Internet  




Jurors must execute their duties separate from outside influence or external 
factual information.
81
 However, there is little doubt that some jurors will perform 
online research during trial.
82
 This research has two primary purposes, terminology 
clarification and information acquisition. A new development will also appear: ju-
rors will look to the purpose or intent of the law to decide how or if it should apply. 
i. Legal Terminology and Instruction 
For many jurors, legal terminology is probably another language.
83
 It is 
characterized as “wordy” and “turgid,” relying on deviation from French 
and Latin text, and generally archaic.
84
 Jurors have varied experiences, 
abilities, language skills, and attention spans.
85
 The combination of this 
strange language, and a constantly diverse juror audience, can result in 
jury instructions that are unclear, or even incomprehensible to jurors.
86
 
As a result, they may feel confused by judicial instructions and termi-
nology used at trial.
87
 Jurors will then turn to the Internet, a familiar, 
perhaps even default, source of definitional guidance.
88
 When that hap-
pens, it will not be the definitions provided by judicial instruction, or in-
                                                          
 80. See Springer, supra note 39.  
 81. See Friedman, supra note 20, at 207. Juries are expected to decide the case presented to them 
on the strength of the evidence adduced by the contending parties. Id. at 204–05. The introduction of evi-
dence is regulated by a series of rules circumscribing the use of certain sorts of proof. Id. The most im-
portant evidence restrictions require that only relevant materials be presented in court and that prejudicial 
materials be excluded. Id. 
 82. See, e.g., Jeffrey T. Frederick, You, the Jury, and the Internet, NAT’L LEGAL RES. GROUP, 
http://cdn2.hubspot.net/hub/79400/file-15647173-pdf/Jury_Reseach_Documents/you(last visited Apr. 9, 
2015) [hereinafter You, the Jury, and the Internet]. In March of 2009 federal judge William Zloch received 
a note that a juror had conducted Internet research during trial. Id. His questioning revealed that eight other 
jurors had conducted such research, including Google searches on the parties, accessing news reports (in-
cluding excluded evidence), and searching online for legal and technical definitions. Id. When asked about 
these searches, one juror responded, “Well, I was curious.” Id. 
 83. See Cheryl Stephens, What is Really Wrong with Legal Language?, PLAIN LANGUAGE 
ASS’N INT’L, (Nov. 27, 1990), http://www.plainlanguagenetwork.org/legal/wills.html (“Linguists identify 
legalese as a distinctive dialect.”). 
 84. Id. 
 85. See Artigliere, supra note 3, at 625.  
 86. See William W. Schwarzer, Communicating with Juries: Problems and Remedies, 69 CALIF. 
L. REV. 731, 732 (1981) (“Prevailing practices of instructing juries are so archaic and unrealistic that even 
in relatively simple cases what the jurors hear is little more than legal mumbo jumbo to them.”). 
 87. As an example, a recent study revealed that almost one-quarter of jurors do not understand 
aspects of rules governing Internet use during trial. Almost a Quarter of Jurors Confused about Rule on 
Internet Use During a Trial, According to New Research Published in Criminal Law Review, REUTERS 
(May 14, 2013, 7:01 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/14/idUSnHUGd5lJ+71+ONE20130514. 
 88. See, e.g., Mark Pearson, When Jurors Go ‘Rogue’ on the Internet and Social Media, 
JOURNLAW (May 30, 2013, 2:12 PM), http://journlaw.com/2013/05/30/when-jurors-go-rogue-on-the-
internet-and-social-media/ (discussing trials where jurors went online to perform term definitional research 
in an Australian terrorism trial and a Maryland state murder trial); Robert Quigley, Juror Uses iPhone to 
Look Up a Dictionary Definition in Court, Sparks Mistrial, THE MARY SUE (Sept. 16, 2010, 10:49 AM), 
http://www.geekosystem.com/iphone-mistrial-definition/ (juror looking up “prudence” in a Florida Man-
slaughter trial); Tapanes v. State, 43 So. 3d 159, 163 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (new trial granted because 
juror used online research to define “prudent”).  
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terpretations discerned from evidence and testimony, that guide verdicts. 
It will be the “answers” provided by the Internet, and such answers will 
not be limited to term definition. 
ii. Jurors “Doing Their Job” 
[J]urors want to do the right thing, but recent experience shows that 
many jurors feel that doing the right thing  
includes doing their own research and communicating  
with others about the case. Some jurors even consider the limits placed 
by judges and lawyers on information  




“[E]very single person who is now sitting in a courtroom has access to just 
about every piece of information ever published anywhere in the world.”
90
 We all 
need to stop and really think about that statement. Jurors can find almost anything 
online. Combine that reality with pervasive Internet use,
91
 almost constant Internet 
access,
92
 and the fact that Internet information may be a way of life,
93
 and it is not 
surprising that jurors perform online research during trial.
94
 It is also no surprise 
that they perform such research, even in direct violation of a court order,
95
 precisely 
because they are trying to “do the right thing” and instructions limiting access may 
cause them to feel the truth is hidden,
96
 adding to their frustration with the entire 
jury process. As one author succinctly understands: 
Information at trial is presented methodically and often slowly and even 
more often, feels incomplete to jurors. Generations of past jurors simply 
                                                          
 89. Artigliere, supra note 3, at 640.See also Grow, supra note 29, at 93 (reporting the following 
comment, posted in response to a New York Times articles asserting that “there are people who feel they 
can’t serve justice if they don’t have answers to certain questions.”) 
If evidence and testimony provided to jurors in the courtroom is incomplete, I feel that any 
rational and responsible juror would seek additional information on their own. The object of 
any court proceeding is to ascertain the facts and arrive at a fair judgment using ALL facts 
obtainable by any means available. If I am ever called and sit on a jury, you had better be-
lieve that everything said will be recorded and photographed so I can take it home and do 
whatever research is required to unravel the case using due diligence. Id. 
 90. Hannaford-Agor, et al., supra note 47, at 1. 
 91. Supra notes 38–44. 
 92. Supra notes 44–48. 
 93. Artigliere, supra note 3, at 627, “Taking away juror’s ability to communicate on social web-
sites or research on the Internet can evoke unexpected reactions and concerns; to many people, such re-
sources are a way of life rather than a tool or toy.” 
 94. “Most jurors who conduct factual or legal research do so because they feel they need better 
or more information than was provided to them at trial.” Szajna, supra note 48. 
 95. See Gareth Lacy, Should Jurors Use the Internet?, THE NAT’L L. REV. (Dec. 6, 2010), 
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/should-jurors-use-internet. For an instruction example from Oregon: 
In our daily lives we may be used to looking for information on-line and to “Google” some-
thing as a matter of routine. Also, in a trial it can be very tempting for jurors to do their own 
research to make sure they are making the correct decision. You must resist that temptation 
for our system of justice to work as it should. I specifically instruct that you must decide the 
case only on the evidence received here in court.  
 96. Id. 
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had to live with that frustration, but today’s jurors do not. They can reme-
dy the situation in mere seconds by opening a search engine and typing in 




However, even if that author’s synopsis is accurate, it still does not excuse the 
end result; jurors using the Internet to “do” their perceived jobs obviate their re-
sponsibilities in our current system. American jurors are triers of fact.
98
 They do 
not elicit testimony, determine admissible evidence, or decide substantive legal 
issues, and they are instructed accordingly.
99
 However, some jurors cannot be con-
fined to these roles.
100
 Jurors have tried contacting witnesses, online, during trial.
101
 
They used the Internet to investigate sentencing guidelines, where such information 
could impact the final verdict.
102
 Jurors even researched evidence that would likely 
be inadmissible, such as a Defendant’s prior criminal convictions.
103
These actions 
are certainly problematic for courts, but they are relatively small threats compared 
to the next likely development. 
Jurors will go beyond current actions to a development yet largely unseen. 
They will perform online research to determine intent, purpose, or even moral ac-
ceptability of applicable law. In other words, jurors will perform Internet research 
to determine if the law in a particular case is “right,”
104
 and then proceed as they 
see “just.”
105
 This is already occurring. In a 2010 death penalty sentencing case, a 
                                                          
 97. Blackman & Brickman, supra note 49. Information at trial is presented methodically and 
often slowly and even more often, feels incomplete to jurors. Id. Generations of past jurors simply had to 
live with that frustration, but today’s jurors do not. Id. They can remedy the situation in mere seconds by 
opening a search engine and typing in a question, a few words, a name or even just the first three letters of a 
search term. Id. 
 98. Legal Terms and Definitions, LAW.COM, 
http://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=2165 (last visited Apr. 9, 2015). 
 99. How Courts Work, AM. B. ASS’N, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_related_education_network/how_court
s_work/juryinstruct.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2015) (“The judge will advise the jury that it is the sole judge 
of the facts and of the credibility (believability) of witnesses. He or she will note that the jurors are to base 
their conclusions on the evidence as presented in the trial.”). 
 100. See Google, Gadgets, and Guilt, supra note 64 at 419 (“There are people who feel they can’t 
serve justice if they don’t find answers to certain questions.”). 
 101. Friedman, supra note 20, at 201–02. 
 102. Blackman & Brickman, supra note 49. 
 103. The Effects of Pre-trial Publicity on Juror Verdicts, ADLSI (Sep. 26, 2014), 
http://www.adls.org.nz/for-the-profession/news-and-opinion/2014/9/26/the-effects-of-pre-trial-publicity-on-
juror-verdicts/ (discussing Attorney General v. Dallas, where a juror used the Internet to discover the De-
fendant had a prior rape conviction). 
 104. American history is clear that jurors sometimes do not apply laws they do not view as 
“right.” Conrad, supra note 7, at 2 (“Early American jurors had frequently refused to enforce the acts of 
Parliament in order to protect the autonomy of the Colonies.”). This “rebellion” is not limited to colonists. 
Negligence jury instructions, even in the 1970s, were reformed so that jurors could not render verdicts 
based on what they desired in the final outcome. See, e.g., Robert Kinney & Jordana Thomadsen, Examin-
ing Wisconsin Jury Instructions, St. B. of Wis. (Aug. 2003), 
http://www.wisbar.org/newspublications/wisconsinlawyer/pages/article.aspx?Volume=76&Issue=8&Articl
eID=459 (last visited April 15, 2014). 
 105. Perhaps that is what some really seek from our jury system. “The public, as Jerome Frank 
put it, ‘turns to the jury for relief from . . . dehumanized justice.’” See Friedman, supra note 20, at 210. The 
problem with such an admirable result is that it requires jurors to do what is “right,” not what is legal. And, 
as so aptly explained by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, “This is a court of law, young man, not a court of 
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single juror held out, resulting in a hung jury.
106
 That juror later revealed he per-
formed his own online “proportionality review,” looking at the background of each 
prisoner currently on that state’s death row.
107
 The juror concluded that the defend-
ant at issue was “not as bad as those prisoners,” so he held out.
108
 When such re-
search and analysis occurs, the entire jury system is challenged, as jurors become 
lawmakers deciding when a law applies, or even exists.
109
 This case also illustrates 
a related concern—the potential power of a single juror using the Internet, particu-
larly when others do not. When not all jurors have or utilize such access, those with 
it can disproportionately influence proceedings.
110
 
D. Jurors will Seek Internet Communication During Trial 
Social media technology allows people to communicate, via the Internet, and 
to share information.
111
 One of the primary reasons the Internet will change the 
American jury system is the sheer number of people using social media. It is not an 
exaggeration to say that social media is everywhere. Facebook
112
 is just one brand 
of social media, but its impact is, depending on perspective, informative or alarm-
ing. In 2004, Facebook had 1 million members
113
 and the world’s population was 
approximately 6.4 billion people.
114
 By mid-2013, the global population had grown 
to an estimated 7.7 billion,
115
 while Facebook had 1.1 billion monthly users.
116
 That 
means currently one in every seven people on the planet use Facebook—an item 
not essential for human life—at least monthly. 
Based on such usage it makes sense that many, likely even most, jurors are 
social media participants.
117
 They carry social media behaviors into juror activities 
because they are accustomed to Internet peer interaction
118
 and may even require 
                                                                                                                                      
justice.” Quotations about Justice, Laws, & Crime, QUOTEGARDEN.COM, 
http://www.quotegarden.com/justice.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2015). 
 106. A FAIR TRIAL, supra note 77. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Friedman, supra note 20, at 209. “Juries are not supposed to question the law itself; that is 
out of bounds.” Id. However that ignores the reality of juror power: “Civil juries, then, make law, or a sort 
of law. But they do it quietly; and their work does not leave many visible traces.” Id. at 211. 
 110. See Smith, supra note 77. 
 111. Social Media Definition, ABOUT.COM, 
http://jobsearch.about.com/od/networking/g/socialmedia.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2015) [hereinafter Social 
Media Definition]. 
 112. Facebook Definition, supra note 63. 
 113. Number of Active Users at Facebook Over the Years, YAHOO! NEWS (May 1, 2013, 7:27 
PM), http://news.yahoo.com/number-active-users-facebook-over-230449748.html. 
114  2004 World Population Reference Sheet, POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU, 
http://www.prb.org/pdf04/04worlddatasheet_eng.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2015). 
 115. Current World Population, WORLDOMETERS, http://www.worldometers.info/world-
population/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2014). 
 116. Number of Active Users at Facebook Over the Years, supra note 113. 
 117. See Hannaford-Agor, supra note 47(“Eighty-seven percent . . . of prospective jurors had per-
sonal email accounts and sixty-four percent . . . had some type of social network account . . . .”). 
 118. See Pearson, supra note 88 (“As social media becomes a part of everyday life, the courts are 
encountering the fact that ordinary citizens have adopted a routine use of social media which they carry into 
the court room.”). 




 Such behaviors include jurors “friending” each other on Facebook during tri-
al
120
 and posting comments about jury service.
121
 Courts usually allow such activi-
ties, so long as juror commentary does not go to the trial at issue.
122
 
However, some jurors publicize information not just for peer interaction, but 
also for peer approval or direction. This distinction is potentially significant. Jurors 
have repeatedly blogged and tweeted about their trial experiences during trial.
123
 
This may demonstrate a relatively innocuous intent to share; it may also reflect 
something deeply troubling about some jurors in the Internet age. At least two au-
thors contend that contemporary jurors may lack confidence in “their collective 
common sense and community values and thus find it necessary to verify initial 
impressions about the evidence or to supplement it with external sources found 
online.”
124
 Jurors are drawn from their geographic communities, at least in part, so 
that they may apply that community’s values.
125
 It makes sense that other commu-
nities, including Internet communities such as social media groups, could influence 
them as well.
126
 Jurors using the Internet for approval or input is highly problematic 
in multiple ways,
127
 and at least one juror has already taken it a step further, going 
                                                          
 119. See Why Smartphone-Obsessed Generation Y Can’t Put Down Their Phones, MASHABLE 
(Dec. 12, 2012), http://mashable.com/2012/12/12/martphone-obsessed-generation-y/. Discussing 
smartphone reliance: 
Two out of five said they “would feel anxious, like part of me is missing,” if they couldn’t 
use their smartphones to stay connected [to the Internet]. One in four people in Gen Y say 
they check their smartphones so much throughout the day they lose count. 
 120. See generally Commonwealth v. Werner, 967 N.E.2d 159 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012). In a sepa-
rate matter, a Judge found out that a juror was undertaking such action and admonished him. See Pearson, 
supra note 88. The juror then posted, on Facebook, “F[uck] the Judge.” Id. When the Judge asked the juror 
about the post, his reply was, “Hey Judge, that’s just Facebook stuff.” Id. 
 121. See, e.g., Pamela MacLean, Jurors Gone Wild, CAL. LAW. (April 2011), 
http://www.callawyer.com/Clstory.cfm?eid=914907&wteid=914907_Jurors_Gone_Wild. 
 122. See Porsha Robinson, Yes Jurors Have a Right to Freedom of Speech Too! . . . Well, Maybe. 
Juror Misconduct and Social Networks, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 593, 609 (2013) (“Communication be-
tween jurors about subjects that do not relate to the trail is generally considered acceptable conduct; the 
problem arises when the juror communicates about what is happening in the trial on which the juror is 
currently sitting.”). 
 123. See Frederick, supra note 68. 
 124. Waters & Hannaford-Agor, supra note 5, at 2. 
 125. See id. “Jurors are drawn from the community at large, so it is only to be expected that jurors 
will reflect the general social outlook and values of their communities. Indeed, one of the primary roles of 
the jury is to inject community values into judicial decision-making.” Id. at 5. 
 126. See Scott Ritter, Beyond the Verdict: Why Courts Must Protect Jurors from Public Exposure 
Before, During, and After High-Profile Cases, 89 IND. L.J. 911, 934 (2014) (“In a close case, a juror might 
factor this expected public response into his or her decision, even subconsciously, seeking to avoid such a 
backlash.”). 
 127. See Google, Gadgets, and Guilt, supra note 64, at 428–29: 
[F]ew, if any, would suggest that jurors be allowed to communicate with third parties about 
the trial prior to verdict. Yet, despite this uniform disapproval, this communication still hap-
pens. Of late, the method of juror-to-third-party contact receiving the greatest amount of at-
tention is online communication.  
For a variety of reasons, courts want to limit juror communications to third parties until a ver-
dict is reached. First, there is concern about maintaining the confidentiality of jury delibera-
tions. Having jurors post information online about ongoing deliberations or other jurors 
would hinder the traditional method of juror decision-making.  
Second, juror communications to third parties undermine the notions of due process and a fair 
trial by providing attorneys with “inside information” into juror decision-making.  
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online to ask Internet “friends” how she should actually decide issues.
128
 Based on 
the extent of Internet use, and the breadth of social media use by potential jurors, 
there is no reason to think that such actions will be anything but frequent in the 
future. 
E. Juries and Jurors Post-Trial 
The virtue of the jury system lies in the random summoning from the 
community of 12 indifferent persons . . .  
and in their subsequent, unencumbered return to their normal pursuits . . 
. the system contemplates that jurors will inconspicuously fade back into 
the community  




While there is no research or treatise on the topic, we have seen juror quotes 
following verdicts.
130
 While these same quotes may be repeated when the media 
focuses on appeal, we have not yet seen significant, ongoing input from those ju-
rors. That will change. Jurors will go online to explain what they did and why they 
did it, in terms of their official responsibilities, because they are accustomed to 
sharing details of their lives online
131
 and because court rules do not prohibit such 
action.
132
 The more individual jurors do this, the unhappier they will be with the 
                                                                                                                                      
The final concern with juror-to-non-juror communication is that the juror, by communicating 
with an outside party about the trial, increases the likelihood that the third party will influence 
the juror’s views. 
 128. See, e.g., Hon. Dennis M. Sweeney, Address to the Litig. Section of the Md. State Bar 
Ass’n: The Internet, Social Media, and Jury Trials: Lessons Learned from the Dixon Trial, (Apr. 29, 2010), 
available at juries.typepad.com/files/judge-sweeney.doc.  
 129. See Marcy Strauss, Sequestration, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 63, 99 (1996). 
130. See, e.g., Alyssa Newcomb, George Zimmerman Juror Says ‘In Our Hearts, We Felt He 
Was Guilty’, ABCNEWS (July 25, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/US/george-zimmerman-juror-
murder/story?id=19770659 (“You can’t put the man in jail even though in our hearts we felt he was guilty,” 
said the woman who was identified only as Juror B29 during the trial. “But we had to grab our hearts and 
put it aside and look at the evidence.”); Anthony Juror: ‘Sick to Our Stomach’ Over Verdict, 
NBCNEWS.COM (July 6, 2011, 7:34 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/43651613/ns/us_news-
crime_and_courts/t/anthony-juror-sick-our-stomach-over-verdict/#.VL7Sd8Z3H8E(“Jennifer Ford, or juror 
No. 3, said the jurors were ‘sick to their stomach’ after coming to the decision. ‘I did not say she was inno-
cent,’ Ford, a 32-year-old nursing student told ABC. ‘I just said there was not enough evidence. If you 
cannot prove what the crime was, you cannot determine what the punishment should be.’”); Andrew 
Branca, Black Juror in Dunn Case: Trial About Justice, not Race, LEGAL INSURRECTION (Feb. 20, 2014, 
9:15 PM), http://legalinsurrection.com/2014/02/black-juror-in-dunn-case-trial-about-justice-not-race/. 
 131. While there is no breakdown of actual content shared, as of September 2013, 73 percent of 
American adults online used some form of social media. See Social Networking Fact Sheet, PEW RES. 
CENTER, http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/social-networking-fact-sheet/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2015). 
 132. See, e.g., Jury Duty: A Handbook for Trial Jurors, TRIAL COURTS OF THE STATE OF WEST 
VIRGINIA, http://www.courtswv.gov/public-resources/jury/juryhdbk.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2015) (appli-
cable to all West Virginia state courts): 
Often when a jury trial is completed, reporters and other members of the media or the attor-
neys and parties involved in the case wish to ask jurors about their deliberations and what fac-
tors influenced the final verdict. Jurors are under no obligation to answer any questions about 
a case or comment upon it in any way. A simple refusal or response of “no comment” should 
suffice. 
On the other hand, if jurors wish to speak with the media or attorneys about the trial, they are 
free to do so. 




 America has seen verdicts resulting in direct threats to jurors, and that 
was when remote communication was largely limited to letters and telephone 
calls.
134
 Jurors using the Internet to explain deliberations and verdicts will face 
scrutiny and attacks that are historically unprecedented and currently unimagina-
ble.
135
 Though it may be due, at least in some cases, to their own actions, many 
future jurors will not be able to return to the anonymity the pre-Internet jury era 
provided. This “juror exposure” will trigger court response. That action will be a 
new development as well. 
In the past courts had little concern for post-trial jurors.
136
 In the future courts 
will use the Internet to support them.
137
 Courts will do so attempting to provide 
“openness,”
138
 and to maintain trust in the jury system as verdicts are publicly (like-
ly online) challenged.
139
 Courts must proceed with caution for at least two reasons. 
First, a judge is in no position to explain how a jury reached its conclusion as he or 
she was not present for deliberations. Second, any attempt to explain what a jury 
did will likely focus attention on the jury itself. Discussing a verdict may lead to 
identification of individual jurors.
140
 Even without specific identification, the en-
tirety of the jury may be subject to threats and harassment when rendering an “un-
popular” verdict.
141
 It is only logical that, when a court explains or defends a ver-
                                                          
 133. Jurors will probably seek to create an audience that “gets it”; one that accepts what they did 
and why. They will not achieve this. Many years ago a person, understanding the futility of “answering” the 
masses, put it in a commonsensical manner. “Former Congressman Charles Brownson, Indianapolis Repub-
lican, used to say, ‘I never quarrel with a man who buys ink by the barrel.’” See Fred Shapiro, Ink by the 
Barrel, FREAKONOMICS, (May 12, 2011, 11:00 AM), http://freakonomics.com/2011/05/12/ink-by-the-
barrel/. Imagine the challenge when the Internet renders the cost of ink moot. Even a small, dissatisfied 
minority, can wage an attack without many limits. If public acceptance is the goal, the juror will never win. 
 134. See Ritter, supra note 126, at 936 (“When police officers were acquitted in the Rodney King 
case, some jurors received ‘taunts, threats, and disturbing phone calls.’”). 
 135. This cannot be understated. Even now we can forecast that some jurors’ true identities will 
be discovered. Then those identities will be investigated, identifying and exposing their real and online 
friends and family. Those people then become targets and the Internet makes it much easier to reach them. 
 136. See A FAIR TRIAL, supra note 77(“For these jurors, their subsequent activities regarding jury 
service are not ordinarily within the scope of the trial court’s concern.”). 
 137. See Waters & Hannaford-Agor, supra note 5, at 6: 
The courts depend on the jurors as representatives of their respective communities to provide 
legitimacy to the justice system. As such, central to the mission of the courts is away to main-
tain the public’s trust and confidence in trial by jury as an effective way to resolve disputes. 
When there is public outrage over a perceived injustice, especially in a notorious trial, the 
courts must work quickly and effectively to counter the public’s doubt.  
 138. See, e.g., Ritter, supra note 126, at 919: 
The value of openness lies in the fact that people not actually attending trials can have confi-
dence that standards of fairness are being observed; the sure knowledge that anyone is free to 
attend gives assurance that established procedures are being followed and that deviations will 
become known. Openness thus enhances both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the 
appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the system. 
 139. See Waters & Hannaford-Agor, supra note 5, at 6: 
[C]entral to the mission of the courts is a way to maintain the public’s trust and confidence in 
trial by jury as an effective way to resolve disputes. When there is public outrage over a per-
ceived injustice, especially in a notorious trial, the courts must work quickly and effectively 
to counter the public’s doubt. 
 140. See generally Ritter, supra note 126. 
 141. See id. at 934. 
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dict, it draws more public attention to that verdict and those jurors. That attention 
generates even more public responses. Those responses constitute a warning for 
potential future jurors.
142
 Courts will use the Internet to explain and support jury 
actions. While that may seem laudable, it does not mean such action will actually 
benefit jurors, or the jury system itself. 
V. POTENTIAL JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO INTERNET USE AND JURIES 
The crux of the dilemma for the justice system is the 
 impending collision between the traditional view of juror impartiality 





At least in terms of current challenges, considerations, and possibilities, there 
are three broad options for courts addressing juror Internet use. Courts may attempt 
to completely eliminate juror Internet use, limit use that prejudices jurors, or em-
brace use within the current jury system. 
A. Attempt to Eliminate Juror Internet Use 
“If you said to me ‘What is the biggest threat to trial by 
 jury in this country?’, I would say to you: ‘No question: 




The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right 
to a trial by an impartial jury.
145
 An impartial jury is one “capable and willing to 
decide the case solely on the evidence before it.”
146
 This will be a difficult, perhaps 
impossible, standard to meet in the future as it is highly unlikely jurors will limit 
themselves to evidence and testimony admitted at trial.
147
 If courts truly want to 
                                                          
 142. I cannot, now, empirically substantiate this, but I suspect that (a) potential Internet identifica-
tion and attacks will dissuade many people from being “available” as jurors in the future but, ironically (b) 
many of those selected to serve as future jurors will voluntarily engage in Internet activities that expose 
them to the responses many were concerned about. 
 143. Waters & Hannaford-Agor, supra note 5, at 4. 
 144. Harris, supra note 38. 
 145. U.S. CONST. amend. VI: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by 
an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which 
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and 
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his de-
fense. 
 146. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982). 
 147. See Google, Gadgets, and Guilt, supra note 64, at 417 (“Since the late 1990s, jurors, rather 
than relying solely on the evidence presented at trial, have increasingly turned to the Internet to obtain 
information about the case on which they sit.”). See also Waters & Hannaford, supra note 5 (discussing the 
impact of Internet media).  
Second is the possibility that contemporary jurors are cognitively either less reliant on or less 
confident in their collective common sense and community values and thus find it necessary 
to verify initial impressions about the evidence or to supplement it with external sources 
found online. 
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Sequestration is the physical isolation of a trial jury from the public.
149
 Quite 
surprisingly, and not a little disturbingly, minimal scholarship exists examining the 
actual power to sequester.
150
 There is no Constitutional right to sequestration, but 
either the court (sua sponte) or a party may move to sequester.
151
 The trial court 
makes the actual sequestration decision,
152
 and no author seriously questions 
whether that court has such authority, where it comes from, or what its limits might 
be.
153
 Historically, sequestration was common and it encouraged the jury to reach 
agreement sometimes by locking jurors up without food, water, heat, or light.
154
 
Modern sequestration is viewed as an extraordinary measure
155
 and attempts to 
shield jurors from improper influence or information.
156
 
American courts combine two mechanisms to keep sequestered jurors from 
external information, judicial order and physical restriction. I discuss each in the 
context of sequestration but, even absent formal sequestration, these are mecha-
nisms courts are likely to use to “ensure” jurors cannot use the Internet. The first, 
judicial order, relies on the combination of a judge’s directive and the good faith of 
the jurors. Simply put, this assumes that if a judge orders jurors to avoid external 
information, jurors will do so. The second, physical access restriction, assumes that 
a court can enact effective physical barriers to external sources.
157
 Both of these are 
flawed assumptions in the Internet age. 
                                                                                                                                      
Waters & Hannaford, supra note 5, at 3.  
 148. See Lacy, supra note 95 (“The best way to keep jurors away from [Internet sources] would 
be to sequester them.”).  
 149. See THE FREE DICTIONARY, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/sequestration (last 
visited Apr. 9, 2015). 
 150. The few authors who touch upon the subject do so with general comments on their percep-
tions of the current authority to sequester, not a historical examination of such power. See, e.g., Strauss 
supra note 129, at 70 (“Currently, sequestration is essentially a statutory creation; each state and the federal 
government has set out in code provisions the rules governing the separation or sequestration of juries.”). 
There is little recent, significant scholarship regarding sequestration, period. See id. at 558. 
 151. O’Leary, supra note 9, at 560. 
 152. This decision may have certain parameters. See Strauss, supra note 129, at 72: 
The varying approaches to sequestration taken by the states and the federal government can 
be divided into three basic categories: (1) sequestration during the trial and deliberation stages 
is solely a matter of judicial discretion in all cases; (2) sequestration, while generally a matter 
of judicial discretion, is mandatory in a certain limited category of cases like felonies or capi-
tal cases, or during deliberations; and (3) sequestration is a matter of judicial discretion except 
when there is a party motion for sequestration. 
 153. There are some subjective, advisory guidelines. See, e.g., Kansas Judicial Branch Standards 
Relating to Jury Use and Management, Standard 19: Sequestration of Jurors, 
http://www.kscourts.org/rules/District_Rules/STANDARDS%20RELATING.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 
2015)(“A jury should be sequestered only when absolutely necessary to protect the jury or ensure justice.”). 
See also State v. Young, 311 S.E. 2d 118, 130 (W. Va. 1983) (The West Virginia Code lists 11 factors a 
court “should look at” when considering sequestration). 
 154. See People v. Webb, 581 N.E.2d 509, 511 (N.Y. 1991). 
 155. See Strauss, supra note 129, at 71. 
 156. See WIS. SCR 73.01–73.03, available at https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/misc/scr/73. 
 157. See Strauss, supra note 129, at 93 (“Sequestered jurors’ television habits are carefully moni-
tored, and they can be provided redacted newspapers and precluded from access to radio”). 
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i. Judicial Instruction and Juror Good Faith 
Courts use jury instructions to govern juror behavior
158
 and can punish viola-
tors with statutory and contempt powers,
159
 but there is no definitive evidence of 
the actual impact of judicial instruction on jurors. While at least one author argues 
that judicial admonition regarding external publicity may be greater than common-
ly thought,
160
 other research concludes that such instructions are not effective in 
directing jurors to ignore information learned outside the courtroom.
161
As to Inter-
net-specific admonishment, many jurors contend that they could follow judicial 
orders prohibiting Internet use,
162
 but a growing percentage of jurors report they 
would not,
163
 while still others, for many reasons, reveal that they may be tempted 
to perform online research during trial.
164
 Thus, we cannot conclude that judicial 
instructions alone are effective. There are even greater efficacy questions when 
juror good faith is examined. 
                                                          
 158. “The first line of defense is obviously to address the issue in jury instructions.” Caren Myers 
Morrison, Can the Jury Trial Survive Google?, 25 CRIM. JUST. (Winter 2011) 1, at 4, 12 available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_magazine/cjw11jurytrial_googl
e.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 159. See Lacy, supra note 95. See also Blackman & Brickman, supra note 49: 
As of September 2010, the U.S. Judicial Conference had sent suggested jury instructions to 
the entire federal judiciary (absent the U.S. Supreme Court) which included admonitions 
against conducting any independent research using the Internet (or traditional media). Simi-
larly, twenty states reference juror Internet use in at least some of their standard jury instruc-
tions. Thus, jurors who nonetheless conduct Internet research often do so in direct violation 
of judicial instructions. Jurors have been fined as a result and in some cases, judges have even 
contemplated charging them with contempt for their trial-related Internet activity. 
 160. See Strauss, supra note 129, at 85 (“Although certainly not foolproof, the effectiveness of 
the judge’s admonition to avoid publicity may very well be underestimated.”). 
 161. See, e.g., Newton N. Minow & Fred H. Cate, Who is an Impartial Juror in an Age of Mass 
Media?, 40 AM. U.L. REV. 631, 648 (1991): 
Judge Learned Hand called such instructions a “placebo,” requiring of the jury “a mental 
gymnastic which is beyond, not only their powers, but anybody’s else. [sic]” Similarly, psy-
chologist Norbert Kerr stated that there has not been a single study which indicates that judi-
cial instructions limit the effects of jury bias. 
 162. See Hannaford-Agor., supra note 47, at 6 (“Eighty-six percent (86%) claimed that they 
could refrain from all Internet usage for the duration of the trial if instructed to do so by the trial judge . . . 
.”). 
 163.  See id. (stating that fourteen percent of prospective jurors responded that they would not be 
able to refrain from all Internet use for the duration of trial, if so instructed by a judge.). 
 164. Id. 
Despite their common understanding about restrictions on their Internet use, a sizeable pro-
portion of prospective jurors reported they would have liked to use the Internet to obtain in-
formation about legal terms (44%), the case (26%), the parties involved (23%), the lawyers 
(20%), the judge (19%), the witnesses (18%), and their fellow jurors (7%). Slightly fewer 
prospective jurors also admitted that they would have liked to use the Internet to email family 
and friends about the trial (8%), connect with another juror (5%), connect with one of the trial 
participants (3%), tweet about the trial (3%), blog about the trial (3%), or post information 
about the trial on a social networking site (2%). Similarly, sizeable numbers of the trial jurors 
and alternates admitted that they would have liked to use the Internet for case-related research 
(28%) and for ex parte communications (29%). The level of interest was approximately equal 
for jurors serving in civil versus criminal trials. 
Id. 
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While it may sound coarse or abrupt, the American jury system is based on 
juror obedience. More specifically, “[t]he constitutional guarantee of trial by jury is 
premised on the fundamental belief that juries will follow the law.”
165
 Jurors are 
supposed to do exactly as they are instructed,
166
 but some jurors believe the good 
faith execution of their duties requires activities outside the confines of the law.
167
 
This attitude seems particularly likely among jurors growing up with regular, even 
constant, Internet access. If these people use the Internet to provide information in 
their “regular” lives, they are likely to use it while serving as jurors. This probabil-
ity makes actual Internet use critical to understanding current and future “good 
faith” juror behavior. 
There are multiple definitions of “generations” but, for purposes of this arti-
cle, three are most important as (a) they encompass most people currently eligible, 
at least based on age, to serve as jurors and (b) information is available regarding 
their Internet habits. The first generation is the Baby Boomers (“Boomers”), those 
born from the mid-1940s to the mid-1960s.
168
 The second is Generation X, those 
born from the later mid-1960s to the mid-1980s.
169
 Finally, there is Generation Y, 
also known as the Millennials, born between the mid-to-late 1980s and the 
2000s.
170
 The data is clear—as we proceed through these generations from oldest to 
youngest—that both frequency and importance of Internet use increase significant-
ly. Some examples are highly informative: 79% of Boomers use the Internet, while 
90% of Millennials do; 2% of Boomers have posted a video of themselves online, 
while 20% of Millennials have;
171
 and 30% of Boomers use a social media net-
working site, while a staggering 75% of Millennials do.
172
 Internet importance is 
not only reflected in use but also in role; almost twice as many Millennials identify 
the Internet as their primary news source (59%) as Boomers (30%).
173
 Additionally, 
we cannot ignore the interrelated fact that many cellular telephones are also Internet 
access devices (or “smartphones”), and smartphone use increases dramatically as 
we move forward through these generations: 28-39% of Boomers own a 




                                                          
 165. United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015, 1025 (3d Cir. 1988).  
 166. See Strauss, supra note 129, at 87 (“The point is that the entire jury system is predicated on 
juror good faith.”). 
 167. See supra text accompanying notes 90–104. 
 168. See, e.g., Meet the Generations, CULTURE COACH INT’L 
http://www.culturecoach.biz/Generations/meetthegenerations.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2015). 
 169. See, e.g., Jennifer Jochim, Generation X Defies Definition, OUTPOST (June 1, 1997) 
http://www.jour.unr.edu/outpost/specials/genx.overvw1.html. 
 170. See Millenials, MASHABLE, http://mashable.com/category/millennials/ (last visited Apr. 9, 
2015). 
 171. See How Digital Behavior Differs Among Millennials, Gen Xers and Boomers, EMARKETER 
(Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.emarketer.com/Article/How-Digital-Behavior-Differs-Among-Millennials-
Gen-Xers-Boomers/1009748 [hereinafter EMARKETER]. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. See EMARKETER, supra note 171. Those numbers probably understate the current reality as 
the article was published in 2012. Some may point to the data regarding “Generation Z,” the generation 
following the Millennials, as supporting a decrease in future smartphone use because “only” 64% of that 
group own a smartphone.” Id. While this is a decrease from the prior generation, it is likely somewhat de-
ceptive as it may reflect current use, but not future use. The article explains that, “Younger consumers are 
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It is obvious and inevitable that jurors will be tied to, and likely even depend-
ent on, information provided by the Internet.
175
 Such reliance on the Internet to 
acquire information, understand concepts, define terms, and make decisions will 
make the Internet inseparable from many juror actions, regardless of judicial in-
struction. But maybe the courts do not have to rely on judicial orders and juror 
good faith to overcome the Internet use temptation. Perhaps there is another way. 
ii. Physical Limitations on Outside Information 
In past years, courts physically restricted juror exposure to the outside world 
while sequestered.
176
 This was probably effective because there were few infor-
mation sources and what existed was largely controllable. As an example, if jurors 
were confined to a hotel and radio, television, and newspapers were removed, ju-
rors could only gain information from in-person contact and that was limited or 
monitored. Such barriers are now largely ineffectual. Jurors can gain outside infor-
mation through their smartphones, tablets, and personal computers. While the sim-
ple response may be “Take those away, too,”
177
 we will soon reach a point where 
we cannot eliminate access to all sources for at least one or both of two reasons. 
First, as recently noted in an opinion by United States Supreme Court Justice Ken-
nedy, Americans are increasingly highly dependent on Internet communications, 
perhaps to the point where use restriction may constitute a violation of a Constitu-
tional right.
178
 Second, and much more pragmatically, true physical limitation of 
juror Internet access will be almost impossible. Jurors are already wearing “Google 
Glass,” eyeglasses combining Internet access with optical necessity,
179
 and industry 
                                                                                                                                      
more likely to have too little money to afford a smart device, compared to their slightly older peers.” Id. In 
other words, Generation Z will buy smartphones just as soon as they can afford them. 
 175. The smartphone is an Internet access tool. It is also a device that is increasingly serving other 
roles and replacing other mechanisms and machines. 24% of Generation Xers, and 41% of Millennials, 
have a cellular telephone and no landline, and 83% of Millennials have slept with their cellular telephones 
next to their beds. See EMARKERTER, supra note 171. The result is that literally, for many, their smartphone 
is always very close at hand (and therefore so is the Internet). Id. For additional perspective regarding the 
utility and predominance of smartphones, look around a room full of people. Compare how many have 
smart phones versus the number with “antiquated” time-pieces, such as wrist watches, or how many record 
appointments in those devices, rather than in a paper organizer.  
 176. This practice decreased over time. See Strauss, supra note 129, at 71.  
 177. See Szajna, supra note 48 (“Taking away the use of smartphones, iPads, and laptops while 
jurors are in the courthouse makes sense and can eliminate the temptation to use technology inappropriately 
during proceedings.”). 
 178. See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760 (2010) (“Cell phone and text message com-
munications are so pervasive that some persons may consider them to be essential means or necessary 
instruments for self-expression, even self-identification.”). While the topic goes well beyond the scope of 
this article, I have no doubt that there will soon be extensive scholarly and judicial discussion about free 
speech and juror online communications. This will range from what jurors can post online while serving, to 
information they may review, to what information may be posted that might bias sitting or potential jurors. 
For a brief starting point, see Eric P. Robinson, Web Restrictions not the Answer to Juror Online Research, 
DIGITAL MEDIA L.AW PROJECT (Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.dmlp.org/blog/2013/web-restrictions-not-
answer-juror-online-research.  
 179. See Paul Saffo, Google Glass Signals a Wearables Revolution, CNN (last updated Apr. 16, 
2014, 11:39 AM) http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/16/opinion/saffo-google-glass/ (although these may be (a) 
fashion or technological accouterment, as opposed to actual necessities, and (b) already fashionably and 
technologically outdated). 
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leaders are exploring clothing that accesses the Internet.
180
 While such “wearables” 
could be removed, jurors will have Internet access actually imbedded in their bod-
ies in the very near future. In fact, similar procedures already occur.
181
 Courts will 
soon reach the point where even physically isolated, naked jurors can access the 
Internet. It is unrealistic to believe that those serving as jurors will be able, or will-
ing, to simply ignore an information source that is otherwise omnipresent. There 
will be no effective physical, judicial barriers to Internet access. 
B. Limit Juror Internet Use that Prejudices Jurors 
i. Direct Court Action 
[I]t is the jurors, together with the judge, who carry  
the burden of keeping the trial process free from  




Unlimited Internet access threatens the jury system,
183
 but, as discussed 
above, use elimination is impossible. So, perhaps, limiting Internet access is a po-
tential alternative. For purposes of this discussion “limiting” means allowing some 
juror Internet access, but not access likely biasing jurors. 
Limitation attempts will begin with jury instructions.
184
 Jurors likely under-
stand these directives,
185
 but effectiveness is a different matter. While many jurors 
                                                          
 180. See Kevin Fitchard, How You and I Could Become Nodes in the Internet of Things, GIGAOM 
(June 3, 2013, 12:51 PM), http://gigaom.com/2013/06/03/how-you-and-i-could-become-nodes-in-the-
internet-of-things/. 
 181. See, e.g., Leslie Katz, Implanted Bluetooth Biochip Gets Under Hacker’s Skin, CNET (Nov. 
1, 2013, 2:20 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/implanted-bluetooth-biochip-gets-under-hackers-skin/. 
 182. See King, supra note 8, at 63. 
 183. See Robbie Manhas, Responding to Independent Juror Research in the Internet Age: Posi-
tive Rules, Negative Rules, and Outside Mechanisms, 112 MICH. L. REV. 809, 815 (2014) (“unfettered 
access to information would invariably expose jurors to impermissibly prejudicial or otherwise inappropri-
ate sources.”). 
 184. Limiting instructions may identify when jurors may use the Internet, and for what pur-
pose(s). 
Some judges have begun to prevent jurors from accessing electronic communication devices 
while court is in session. The Michigan Supreme Court, for example, recently amended its 
rules to require that jurors “shall not . . . use a computer, cellular phone, or other electronic 
device with communication capabilities while in attendance at trial or during deliberation.”  
But open lines to the outside world also connect, inter alia, parents with their children, and 
employees to employers. Thus, the Michigan Supreme Court’s rule permits electronic devices 
to “be used during breaks or recesses but . . . not . . . to obtain or disclose information.”  
Bell, supra note 28, at 86–87. 
Such instructions may also explain why Internet use is limited, rather than simply implementing re-
striction.  
Rather than discourage jurors’ sense of moral duty, the courts might strive to redirect it by 
educating jurors as to the powerful reasons why their duty is to avoid outside information ra-
ther than to seek it out . . . [t]hese questions would be used not to eliminate jurors, but to rein-
force the seriousness of the judge’s later, more complete admonition against conducting out-
side research. 
Preliminary instructions, therefore, should be used not only to admonish jurors as to what be-
havior is prohibited, but also to educate them as to why their access to information is limited.  
 
2015] SPRING EDITION 413 
 
claim they would follow judicial directives,
186
 not all would;
187
 many would still be 
highly tempted to go online,
188
 and some may lie about actual or potential Internet 
use to avoid court sanctions.
189
 The issue is then whether (or how) courts can but-
tress admonishments to actually limit Internet use creating bias. Current possibili-
ties include limiting juror access to Internet access devices,
190
 showing jurors ex-
amples of permissible and impermissible activities,
191
 using voir dire to identify 
Internet use patterns,
192
 and requiring jurors to sign a written pledge not to “im-
properly” use the Internet.
193
 These will not be effective, for several reasons. 
First, limiting juror Internet access devices will be an incomplete effort. Re-
gardless of restriction, jurors will still have opportunities to go online,
194
 and there 
will be too many access avenues to remove them all.
195
 Second, courts cannot ef-
fectively provide jurors current examples of what to do, or not to do, when address-
ing constantly and rapidly evolving technology.
196
 Third, voir dire queries have a 
fundamental problem; jurors may not answer honestly.
197
 It is obvious that one of 
the purposes of asking jurors about Internet use is to provide information for poten-
                                                                                                                                      
Id. at 94. 
 185. See Hannaford-Agor, supra note 47, at 6 (“[Jury] instructions appear to have had the desired 
effect on jurors insofar that most of them correctly understood these basic restrictions. Two-thirds of the 
prospective jurors, for example, reported that using the Internet to research any aspect of the case or the trial 
participants would violate the judge’s instructions . . . .”).  
 186. “Eighty-six percent (86%) claimed that they could refrain from all Internet usage for the 
duration of the trial if instructed to do so by the trial judge . . . .” Id.  
 187. 14% of prospective jurors responded that they would not be able to refrain from all Internet 
use for the duration of trial, even if so instructed by a judge. Id. This percentage may be low. At least one 
study shows that the Internet may be the most “needed” information source for American adults, with 46% 
of study respondents stating it would be “very hard or impossible to give up” the Internet. See 5 Fascinating 
Graphs that Show How We Use the Internet, TIME (Feb. 27, 2014), http://newsfeed.time.com/2014/02/27/5-
fascinating-graphs-that-show-how-we-use-the-internet/photo/internetgraph6/.  
 188. See Hannaford-Agor, supra note 47, at 6. 
 189. “There is lingering concern that some jurors may be reluctant to disclose misconduct involv-
ing new media while they are under the control of the trial judge.” Id. at 8. 
 190. See Manhas, supra note 183, at 815–16. 
 191. See, e.g., David Aaronson & Sydney Patterson, Modernizing Jury Instructions in the Age of 
Social Media, 27 ABA Criminal Justice 4 (2013), available 
athttp://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1233&context=facsch_lawrev. 
 192. See, e.g., Sonia Chopra, Using the Internet and Social Media in Jury Selection, PLAINTIFF 
MAGAZINE 1, 1 (2012), available at http://www.plaintiffmagazine.com/Feb12/Chopra_Using-the-Internet-
and-social-media-in-jury-selection_Plaintiff-magazine.pdf. 
 193. See Aaronson & Patterson, supra note 191.  
194. See Manhas, supra note 183, at 816 (“[J]urors can always use electronic devices before they 
arrive and can also use them after they depart, which is problematic when trials last longer than a day.”) For 
trials lasting less than a day, limitation may still be ineffective. “Although such a [restriction] may prevent 
jurors from using electronic devices in the courthouse, in some jurisdictions, jurors can use them during 
breaks.” Id. 
 195. See supra text accompanying notes 179–83. 
 196. Instagram is an excellent example. It is a social media tool allowing people to take, edit, and 
post photographs online. See Kelly Lux, What is Instagram and Why is it So Popular?, SYRACUSE UNIV. 
(Dec. 15, 2011), http://infospace.ischool.syr.edu/2011/12/15/what-is-instagram-and-why-is-it-so-popular/.It 
launched, meaning became publicly available, on October 6, 2010. Id. It was the number one application 
downloaded in the App Store within 24 hours of launch. Id. It had more than 1,000,000 downloads by 
December 21, 2010. Id. There is no doubt that some jurors were using Instagram before some judges even 
knew it existed. 
 197. See, e.g., Jury Selection: Myths and Realities About Jurors, DECISIONQUEST, 
http://www.decisionquest.com/utility/showArticle/?objectID=475 (last visited Apr. 9, 2015) (“[R]esearch 
supports that, for a variety of reasons, jurors lie while answering questions during voir dire.”). 
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tial monitoring. Effective monitoring requires that jurors answer Internet use ques-
tions truthfully and that courts have the time and knowledge to utilize necessary 
follow up questions, such as ascertaining online user names.
198
 Neither of these 
requirements are close to certainties, making limitation via the combination of voir 




The Internet Pledge is a judicial device making each juror promise he or she 
will not access the Internet in manners biasing that juror when carrying out his or 
her responsibilities.
200
Judge Shira A. Scheindin of New York probably implement-
ed the first incarnation: 
I agree that during the duration of this trial, I will not use the Internet to 
conduct any research into any of the issues or parties involved in this trial. 
I will not communicate with anyone about the issues or parties in this trial, 
and I will not permit anyone to communicate with me. I further agree that 
I will report any violations of the Court’s instructions immediately.
201
 
The Internet Pledge is a written agreement, not part of standard jury instruc-
tions.
202
 It focuses juror attention, specifically, on Internet use.
203
 The Judge deliv-
ers it separate from other directives, requiring written acceptance, likely further 
increasing its importance in jurors’ minds.
204
 At first blush, the Internet Pledge 
seems like it should limit juror-biasing Internet use. However, closer inspection 
reveals two potentially crippling shortcomings. First, the Internet Pledge appears 
enforceable but, in many cases, it is designed to intimidate, not actually mandate 
behavior.
205
 Second, even when presented to jurors in a “special” way, it is still just 
                                                          
 198. See You, the Jury, and the Internet, supra note 82 (Noting that, in a recent federal case, 11 
percent of potential jurors had used social media websites and none of them had user names matching their 
actual full names). 
 199. See, e.g., Anita Ramasastry, Should Jurors Take a “No Internet” Pledge? The Merits of One 
Judge’s Simple Proposal, VERDICT (Sept. 27, 2011),http://verdict.justia.com/2011/09/27/should-jurors-
take-a-no-internet-pledge. 
 200. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 28, at 88: 
The San Diego Superior Court has recently adopted a novel policy requiring jurors to sign 
declarations saying that they will not use the Internet or other media to conduct research. Ju-
ror conduct in violation of the declaration is punishable by fine, probation, and possible jail 
time. 
 201. See Shira A. Scheindlin, The Impact of the Digital Age on Courts, Lawyers, and the Public: 
Revisiting Fundamental Assumptions About Traditional Litigation, http://modern-
courts.ca/documentation/Scheindlin%20-%20Forum%202012%20Closing.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2015). 
 202. See id. 
 203. Waters & Hannaford-Agor, supra note 5, at 1 (“For some jurors, reliance on [Internet] tech-
nologies for everyday tasks has become so ingrained that it would require conscious effort to refrain from 
doing so for the duration of a trial.”). 
 204. Ramasastry, supra note 199 (“Moreover, the Internet issue may get lost in the reading of 
long, complex jury instructions. Having a separate pledge, in contrast, would ensure that jurors focus specif-
ically on the Internet issue, and would put them in the position not of passive listeners, but of active readers, 
signers, and promissors [sic].”). 
 205. See, e.g., Colin Moynihan, Judge Considers Pledge for Jurors on Internet Use, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 18, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/19/nyregion/us-judge-considers-making-jurors-vow-
not-to-use-web.html (“I can’t seize their computers and their BlackBerrys,” she said. “I can’t lock them up. 
I can try to intimidate them.”). There is a related concern. If compliance was the true purpose, violation 
would likely require punishment. That could be problematic in the larger picture: 
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a judicial order limiting Internet use and research is clear that many jurors will not, 
or may not, follow such directives.
206
 
ii. Court “Outsourcing” 
There is also an unexplored, but intertwined resource issue. If courts admon-
ish jurors not to access certain Internet content or engage in specified online activi-
ties, someone must monitor to ensure judicial directives are actually followed. Who 
will this be? It seems unlikely, in this era of judicial budget constraints, the courts 
will have the people, time, technology, or money required for monitoring.
207
 They 
could “outsource” this obligation, but would have to do so in a way that does not 
increase costs. Who could provide such “free” labor?
208
 The surprising answer is 
the attorneys involved in the respective cases.
209
 
Lawyers are not employees of the courts, so the courts cannot require them to 
“go forth and monitor,” but courts can “encourage” aspects of attorney monitoring 
via ethical mandates. ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct Model Rule 3.5, 
“Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal” provides, in pertinent part, that: 
A lawyer shall not: 
(a) seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official by 
means prohibited by law; 
(b) communicate ex parte with such a person during the proceeding unless 
authorized to do so by law or court order.
210
 
Some states may also have similar ethical rules regarding jurors. As an exam-
ple, New York Rule of Professional Conduct 3.5 requires, in pertinent part: 
                                                                                                                                      
[I]t is generally inadvisable to punish jurors who conduct outside research. Unless widely 
publicized, punishment is unlikely to deter future misconduct. If it were publicized, the pro-
spect of punishment is likely to discourage people from jury service altogether. Threats may 
also have a negative effect on a jury’s relationship with the court. Intimidated jurors might re-
frain from making legitimate inquiries or reporting other jurors’ misbehavior. 
Bell, supra note 28, at 94. 
 206. See Hannaford-Agor, supra note 47. 
 207. See, e.g., Bill Raftery, Iowa State of the Judiciary: Budget Cut “Undermines the Public’s 
Confidence in the Reliability of our Justice System and Hinders the State in Achieving its Goal of a Vibrant 
Economy,” GAVEL TO GAVEL (Jan. 17, 2012) http://gaveltogavel.us/2012/01/17/iowa-state-of-the-judiciary-
undermines-the-publics-confidence-in-the-reliability-of-our-justice-system-and-hinders-the-state-in-
achieving-its-goal-of-a-vibrant-economy/. 
Yet, while we have faced budget cuts year after year, resulting in a workforce smaller than we 
had 24 years ago, our workload has increased dramatically. During this 24-year period, the 
number of cases filed with our courts, excluding simple misdemeanors and traffic violations, 
has increased 50%. During this same time, the Code of Iowa has increased in size by 79%. A 
recent report of the Legislative Service Agency of this state revealed that we have cut our 
full-time workforce 16.5% since 2003, while the workforce in state government as a whole 
has grown 1.6%.  
Id. 
 208. “Free” here means “of no financial costs to the courts.” 
 209. These attorneys may not provide truly free labor. They may bill their clients for such time 
and service. 
 210. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.5 (2013). 
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(b) During the trial of a case a lawyer who is not connected therewith shall 
not communicate with or cause another to communicate with a juror con-
cerning the case. 
(c) All restrictions imposed by this Rule also apply to communications 
with or investigations of members of a family of a member of the venire or 
a juror. 
(d) A lawyer shall reveal promptly to the court improper conduct by a 
member of the venire or a juror, or by another toward a member of the ve-




Such mandates, though historically not applied to Internet activities, could be 
used to monitor both attorney and juror Internet conduct. A court could issue an 
order prohibiting a) attorneys from having any online contact with jurors or pro-
spective jurors and b) placing whatever restrictions on juror Internet access or 
communications it viewed necessary. It could then “remind” attorneys of their ethi-
cal obligations. Any attorney who then personally participated in prohibited con-
duct could be ethically sanctioned, and they would have the ethical duty to report 
both attorneys and jurors engaging in prohibited activities (who, in turn, could also 
be sanctioned).This is an obvious “stick” and many attorneys will initially resent it. 
However, they will realize (some quite quickly) the pragmatic “carrot”; lawyers 
need to monitor Internet use by jurors and opposing counsel to protect their client’s 
interests. While the courts cannot specifically order attorneys to monitor Internet 
use, they can create a procedure with the same final result. The courts will likely 
find the American Bar Association an ally here as well.
212
 Even if the courts did not 
encourage attorney monitoring, juror lists are likely available to the public and,
213
 
                                                          
 211. NEW YORK RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.5 (2013), available 
athttp://nycourts.gov/rules/jointappellate/NY-Rules-Prof-Conduct-1200.pdf.  
212. On April 24, 2014, the ABA’s Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibil-
ity issued Formal Opinion 466. The background is as follows: “There is a strong public interest in identify-
ing jurors who might be tainted by improper bias or prejudice. There is a related and equally strong public 
policy in preventing jurors from being approached ex parte by the parties to the case or their agents,” the 
opinion says. “Lawyers need to know where the line should be draw between properly investigating jurors 
and improperly communicating with them. In today’s Internet-saturated world, the line is increasingly 
blurred.” See Dan Berexa, ABA Formal Ethics Opinion Addresses Internet Research on Jurors and Poten-
tial Jurors, DAN BEREXA’S TENNESSEE LAW BLOG, 
http://www.tennlawblog.com/dan_berexas_tennessee_law/2014/04/aba-.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2015).  
The text of Formal Opinion 466 states, in pertinent part: 
Unless limited by law or court order, a lawyer may review a juror’s or potential juror’s Inter-
net presence, which may include postings by the juror or potential juror in advance of and 
during a trial, but a lawyer may not communicate directly or through another with a juror or 
potential juror. 
In the course of reviewing a juror or potential juror’s Internet presence, if a lawyer discovers 
evidence of juror or potential juror misconduct that is criminal or fraudulent, the lawyer must 
take reasonable remedial measures including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.  
See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 466 (2014). 
 213. While this result will be state—if not jurisdiction—specific, the results are likely to be simi-
lar to the following example :In Florida, the Attorney General’s opinion is that, “ . . . consistent with the 
decision in Kever v. Gilliam, it is my opinion that section 322.20(9), Florida Statutes, does not operate to 
exempt from public disclosure jurors’ names and addresses appearing on a jury list compiled by the clerk of 
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where statutes restrict general public access,
214
 to parties and their attorneys. The 
end result is that monitoring will occur anyway. 
C. Embrace Internet Use Within the Current Jury System 
Can even the best and most explicit of instructions,  
coupled with the harshest of consequences and  
penalties for violation, stop jurors from taking advantage  
of the vast resources that the Internet has to offer  
as they try to make sense of what they are hearing in court 
each day? And equally important, is this an effort worth making?  
Or, is it time to acknowledge that the world has  
irrevocably changed, and that it is no longer feasible to expect jurors  




Clichés are sometimes accurate. In this case, times have changed and courts 
must embrace juror Internet use out of necessity and reality.
216
 Traditionally, jurors 
received information in “bits and pieces,” evidence coming to them through the 
direct and cross examination of separate witnesses, sometimes over extended and 
interrupted periods of time.
217
 There are few, if any, forums in American society 
where the only permissible information is so presented.
218
 Current sitting and pro-
spective jurors reflect that reality. Many are accustomed to constant, fast-paced, 
information access and retrieval.
219
 They may “skim” for information not focusing 
on, much less actually digesting, entire content.
220
 In short, modern American ju-
rors may be unwilling, unable, or improperly conditioned to identify, retain, pro-
cess, or analyze disparate information, much less do all of those things to generate 
a “traditional” verdict. That disconnect will frustrate jurors,
221
 who will turn to the 
Internet for guidance, and feel justified doing so.
222
 
                                                                                                                                      
court.”  See Records, Disclosure of Juror Names, Advisory Legal Opinion - AGO 2005-61 (Fla. Att’y Gen. 
2005), available at 
http://www.myfloridalegal.com/ago.nsf/Opinions/4A410DA4389543CC852570C000750D51. 
 214. See, e.g., Steven D. Zansberg, The Public’s Right of Access to Juror Information Loses More 
Ground,17 COMM. LAW. 11, 11–22 (2000).  
 215. See Blackman & Brickman, supra note 49. 
 216. See Google, Gadgets, and Guilt, supra note 64, at 422: 
[I]n the Digital Age, Internet usage has become increasingly common and popular. As a re-
sult, more people have grown accustomed to and reliant on it. In fact, “going online” to find 
information has become almost instinctive, something people do without giving it much 
thought.  
 217. See Waters & Hannaford-Agor, supra note 5, at 2 (“The jurors’ task involves taking the in-
dividual bits of trial evidence and piecing it together into a coherent picture that can be tremendously com-
plicated.”). 
 218. See id. at 2 (“The format is exceedingly archaic and is almost never employed in other set-
tings in which information is communicated to a lay audience.”). 
 219. See id. 
 220. See id. 
 221. Id. at 3 (“The traditional style of trial procedure is more and more likely to perplex and an-
tagonize jurors who will have greater difficulty making sense of how its organizational framework presents 
disparate and detailed pieces of trial evidence.” ). 
 222. Id. 
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Jurors need the Internet and their Internet use cannot be stopped. Courts will, 
likely grudgingly and reluctantly,
223
 but inevitably, accept that reality. They must 
then find a compromise allowing jurors the Internet access they require, while also 
limiting those same jurors to their role as triers of fact. Any such conciliation re-
quires radical change because it allows jurors to function beyond their traditional, 
physical, “four walls” environment. Whatever this “final” structure,
224
 the courts 
will walk a very difficult line. They cannot allow Internet use making jurors triers 
of law, but they will have to permit Internet activity potentially biasing jurors. 
Likely, the first development will be courts allowing juror-to-juror communication, 
via the Internet, regarding a pending case. Currently, most jurisdictions prohibit 
any form of juror-to-juror communication prior to deliberations.
225
The rationale is 
that such communication may cause or allow jurors to prematurely make up their 
minds.
226
 Soon practical reality will trump potential risk. Traditional restriction will 
prove impossible as people use the Internet as a primary information source. 
227
 
Jurors need perspective from fellow jurors to understand and execute their respon-
sibilities,
228
 and such access is readily and increasingly available.
229
 
Courts will allow Internet use; they will also “direct” it. The most immediate 
example will probably be juror monitoring, during both voir dire and jury service. 
This process will likely have four steps. First, courts will publicly announce that 
monitoring will occur. Second, courts will use traditional voir dire to try to ascer-
tain juror Internet habits and online identities, then go online to verify responses.
230
 
Third, once jurors are selected, courts will monitor juror Internet activities,
231
 at-
tempting to ensure jurors are without (at least publicized) bias,
232
 and that they do 
                                                                                                                                      
As individuals increasingly rely on the Internet to access information to help navigate their 
environment and interpret the world, it will likely become ever more difficult to prevent them 
from doing so when serving as trial jurors. After all, jurors understand that jury service is a 
serious task that requires the greatest degree of attention and competence. It will become in-
creasingly counterintuitive to jurors that they would violate a solemn oath by using the very 
tools on which they normally rely to inform their judgments in serious matters. 
Waters & Hannaford-Agor, supra note 5, at 4. 
 223. This is probably a gross understatement. 
 224. I use the term, but it will not be “final.” This article begins a discussion; nobody can truly 
know where the Internet will take the American judicial system. 
 225. See Google, Gadgets, and Guilt, supra note 64, at 426. 
 226. See Szajna, supra note 48, at 564–65. 
 227. As an analogy, in 2011, 41% of Americans got most of their national and international news 
from the Internet. That was up 17 percentage points from 2007. See THE PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE 
PEOPLE & THE PRESS, Internet Gains on Television as Public’s Main News Source 2 (2011), available at 
http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/689.pdf. 
 228. See Szaina, supra note 48, at 565 (“Jurors are confronted with a wholly unfamiliar situation 
when they are called for jury duty. Not allowing them to communicate with each other can only add to their 
feelings of anxiety and uncertainty.”).  
 229. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 179–83. 
 230. As previously discussed, courts will likely rely on attorneys to perform this function and at-
torneys will eventually realize they need to do so to protect their clients’ interests. See supra Part IV.B.ii. 
 231. See id. 
 232. Even rudimentary monitoring would likely reveal conduct like the following: 
Last month, a person using the Twitter name @JohnnyCho wrote that he was in a pool of po-
tential jurors in Los Angeles Superior Court, and tweeted, “Guilty! He’s guilty! I can tell!” In 
later tweets, @JohnnyCho said he was picked for the jury and that the defendant was convict-
ed. 
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not engage in actions making them triers of fact. Fourth, when jurors or prospective 
jurors are caught, they will be publicly recognized. “Recognition” may not involve 
revealing specific identities, but results will be publicized to promote deterrence.
233
 
The reality is that the cheaters are usually ahead of the testers. That means that ju-
ror monitoring is not going to catch all inappropriate activity. But the publicized 
threat and use of monitoring should make jurors less likely to engage in prohibited 
activities as they believe they could be caught;
234
 and even imperfect monitoring 
will catch some and likely deter others. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For those waiting for a neat summary of how the American jury system can 
“deal with” the Internet, this section will be disappointing. The Internet is technol-
ogy and technology constantly evolves. Any attempt to align the jury system and 
the Internet is a point-in-time endeavor. As a result, when any such undertaking is 
“finished,” things will have already changed—perhaps significantly. We must ac-
cept that the Internet genie is out of the bottle. There is no going back. Courts can 
only decide how they will attempt to move forward, using a system based on con-
fining jurors within four walls, in an informational world where those walls are 
rapidly falling. This article provided a comprehensive analysis of how the Internet 
is impacting, and will impact, the present American jury system, based on what we 
know and see now. It also sets the stage for the future American judicial system, 
one coming much quicker than most expect, where the Internet moves from its cur-
rent supporting role, to a lead player.
235
 
                                                                                                                                      
Grow, supra note 29. These posts were discovered by a search monitoring Twitter and reading all tweets 
containing the term “jury duty.” Id. 
 233. Revealing identities would create a dilemma. On one hand, it might be quite effective. As 
one judge noted in an analogous matter, “Most of us care what people think of us…[i]f we’re held up to 
public embarrassment, we don’t like it. It does serve as a deterrent.” See La, Public Humiliation as a Crime 
Deterrent, CIRCLE OF MOMS (July 3, 2010), http://www.circleofmoms.com/debating-mums/public-
humiliation-as-a-crime-deterrent-559413. On the other, such public unmasking could quell interest in being 
a juror. See Facebook Definition, supra note 63, at 636 (“Some believe that this dread will become more 
acute and cause the national jury summons reply rate to fall even lower as jurors realize that, in addition to 
answering very personal questions during voir dire, they must submit to online investigations.”). 
 234. See The Free Dictionary, supra note 50, at 35 (“Once jurors learn that their public online ac-
tivities are subject to monitoring, they will be less inclined to violate court rules for fear of being caught.”). 
 235. While this article focused on the jury system, the most immediate change will be at the ap-
pellate level. Notices and briefs will be, where they are not already, electronically submitted and dissemi-
nated for review. Judges addressing appeals without oral arguments will not need to meet in-person, and 
will deliberate via online video. It will occur to some that it is not necessary to even have judges and attor-
neys in the same room for oral arguments and that these can also occur online. These developments will be 
supported by argument and studies of efficiency and cost-savings, and not subject to the same Constitution-
al challenges that may exist at trial (such as the right to confront accusers under the Sixth Amendment) as 
the procedure is very different. This article begins the conversation of where the Internet will take the 
American judicial system, like it or not. 
